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I. INTRODUCTION
In April of this year, the U.S. Supreme Court handed landowners their first
defeat in over a decade by holding that a thirty-two-month development
moratorium imposed on certain land surrounding Lake Tahoe was not, on its
face, a per se regulatory taking of property. But the opinion, Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,' exists in
something of a vacuum. That is so because Tahoe-Sierra is not a natural
extension of the Court's recent jurisprudence, but the Court neither reversed
nor significantly contracted existing precedent. The opinion simply stands by
itself, adding little and leaving largely intact the law on total regulatory takings
after Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.2 Furthermore, Tahoe-Sierra
has no affect on the application of either City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes
at Monterey, Ltd.,' which held that compensation is the proper remedy for a
regulatory taking, or the recent decision of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,4 which
disposed entirely of the notice issue, at least with respect to categorical
takings. Indeed, the Court was at pains to make clear that the Tahoe
landowners made "only a facial attack" (as opposed to an as-applied challenge)
on the moratoria ordinance and resolutions, and, therefore, faced "an uphill
battle" that was made "especially steep by their desire for a categorical rule
requiring compensation whenever the government impose[d] such a
moratorium on development."5 In short, the Court held that Tahoe Sierra
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presented a very narrow question of law and that the plaintiffs argued it in a
most difficult manner.
In response to this narrow question, the Court held that the mere enactment
of a temporary moratorium does not always effect a categorical taking of
property.6 The Court, however, clearly rejected the argument that moratoria
never do so. 7 According to the Court, the outcome will depend upon the facts
of the case. Consequently, the Court concluded that the appropriate challenge
is as-applied, and the proper analytical framework is likely that set out in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.8 Under that rubric, the factors
to be weighed and balanced are (1) the rationale for the moratorium land and
its length (the "morphed" interpretation of the "character of the governmental
action"); and (2) its economic impact on the landowner, in particular the
interference with her distinct (some would have it "reasonable"), investment-
backed expectations.9
Whether or not this is unfortunate depends, of course, on one's point of
view, but it is certainly not calamitous. Clearly, the majority that gave us not
only Lucas, but also Nollan v. California Coastal Commission," Dolan v. City
of Tigard," and Palazzolo had already showed signs of strain when two
members of the Palazzolo majority split over the application of the notice rule
to partial takings. Justice Scalia would never consider a landowner's notice
of existing regulations, arguing that the land use restriction should be as
constitutional to the first owner as it is to the last.'2 Justice O'Connor,
however, would consider what the landowner knew or should have known
when she acquired the property, arguing it would be unfair to do otherwise.' 3
Observed from this perspective, the Court's narrow decision in Tahoe-Sierra
merely confirms the Court's aversion to categorical rules and its preference for
the balancing approach that has characterized most regulatory takings
6 See id. at 1478, 1489.
7 Id. at 1478 n.16, 1486. The courts that rely on Tahoe-Sierra for something more are
simply mistaken. See, e.g., Manke Lumber Co., Inc. v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt.
Hearings Bd., No. 26580-0-H1, 2002 Wash. App. Lexis 1161, at *24-25 (Wash. Ct. App. May
17, 2002) (noting that Tahoe-Sierra held that a "32-Month loan on development [was] not a
regulatory taking because it [was] only temporary, not permanent."); Mays v. Bd. of Trs. of
Miami Township, C.A. Case. No. 18997, 2002 Ohio App. Lexis 3347, at *8-9 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 23, 2002) ("In order to constitute a 'regulatory' taking, the measure involved must be
permanent in nature and of such a character and effect that the owner is deprived of all or
substantially all economic use of his land that is feasible.").
' 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
9 Id. at 124; see also Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1489.
10 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
512 U.S. 374 (1994).
12 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 637 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring).
"3 Id. at 633-34 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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jurisprudence since Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.4 Indeed, the Lucas
Court acknowledged that its per se rule would apply only in the "relatively
rare" situation where "the owner of real property has been called upon to
sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good,
that is, to leave his property economically idle."' 5  Even First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles 6 provided for takings-
free delays, when such delays are part of the normal land development
process. 7 But the question of whether that exception applied to moratoria as
well was an issue virtually from the time First English was decided. After
Tahoe-Sierra, that question has been answered somewhat in the affirmative.
Thirty-two months is, of course, a long "normal" delay. Indeed, the actual
delay was far longer, but the Court chose not to deal with that. So, are we to
assume that any moratorium of thirty-two months or less passes constitutional
muster? No, and it would be irresponsible to do so. The facts and legal
posture of Tahoe-Sierra were critical to the outcome. The Court had before
it a moratorium imposed by a bi-state agency for the purpose of fulfilling its
duty to preserve the clarity of Lake Tahoe, a nationally-recognized treasure of
unusual and striking beauty.' 8 The Court was clearly impressed by the
planning and rationale for the moratoria, and, therefore, was not about to strike
it down on principle, that is, on a facial attack. It is difficult to believe,
however, that the Court would blithely accept, for example, a moratorium of
the same period imposed by a local government while amending its
comprehensive plan. Reading more into the case from a planning perspective
is like looking into a crystal ball, and the proverbial "ground glass" warning
applies.
That is really all Tahoe-Sierra did. What then can we glean from the
sometimes sweeping dicta and other nuances? Several things, none of which
the least bit surprising, and none at all certain to command a majority should
a case arise in which any one is the principal issue before the Court. First,
Justice Stevens does not like categorical rules in the takings context, and he
will do his best to eliminate them. Thus, his attack on Lucas, from which he
vigorously dissented, and his transparent attempt to convert the "all
economically viable use" standard into a "no economic value" rule, which
would essentially eviscerate Lucas, came as no surprise. Second, sensible land
use planning is good, and we should all support it. That is, of course, obvious
and something even Chief Justice Rehnquist agrees with. In First English, for
14 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
"5 Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018-19 (1992).
16 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
I ld. at 321-22.
8 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Plann'g Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465,
1470-73 (2002).
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example, the Chief Justice acknowledged the importance of planning and
sympathetically recognized that the Court's decision would "lessen to some
extent the freedom and flexibility of land-use planners and governing
bodies."' 9 The difference is that the Chief Justice did not believe the need for
good planning curtailed the Court's mandate to protect constitutional rights.2"
Nor, for that matter, did Justice Brennan when some twenty years ago he
quipped, "After all, a policeman must know the Constitution, then why not a
planner?"'" The point is simple: the Constitution, not ever-evolving policy
considerations, should inform the Court's opinions. Finally, segmentation,
also called the denominator or relevant parcel issue, continues to divide the
Court. Therefore, the war of footnotes and dicta commenced in Lucas and
resumed in Palazzolo is likely to continue until the Court finally takes a case
and resolves it.
II. CATEGORICAL RULES AND THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY
The basic thrust of the plaintiffs' argument in Tahoe-Sierra was that
development moratoria by definition leave most vacant land without any
discernible economic use, and, therefore, moratoria are squarely within the
Lucas categorical rule. 2 The Lucas rule provides that when a regulation
deprives land of all economically viable use, the Fifth Amendment requires
compensation.23 The rule is, of course, subject to two narrow exceptions, 24 but
neither exception was present under the Tahoe-Sierra facts. Thus, the
landowners argued, the case was easy and they should win. Indeed, the only
way to avoid such a result was for the Court to find some basis for taking the
case beyond the application of the categorical rule.
One way to move the applicable regulatory takings doctrine from the Lucas
per se rule to the Penn Central balancing test is to identify those characteristics
in Lucas that require abandoning the categorical analysis. This the Tahoe-
Sierra Court did by defining the relevant parcel to include more than the
challenged moratorium period. A second way is to emphasize that factors, like
governmental planning, need to be considered in any decision, and that cannot
'9 See First English, 482 U.S. at 317, 321-22.
20 Id. at 321.
2 San Diego Gas & Elec. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26 (1981) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
22 See Brief for Petitioners, 2000 U.S. Briefs 1167,32-39, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc.
v. Tahoe Reg'l Plann'g Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002) (No. 00-1167).
23 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029-30 (1992).
24 Id. The so-called Lucas exceptions, "nuisance and background principles of a state's law
of property," are discussed at length by D. Callies and D. Breemer in Background Principles,
in TAKING SIDES ON TAKING ISSUES (T. Roberts ed., 2002).
2003 / MORATORIA AND MUSINGS
be done in a per se or categorical analysis. This, too, the majority did and did
with some enthusiasm. Finally, a third way is to attack the per se rule itself,
and Justice Stevens did so at every turn.
The majority began by undermining part of the rationale for the categorical
rule by making it very clear that physical takings jurisprudence is, in its view,
totally inapposite to regulatory takings. Writing for the majority, Justice
Stevens stated:
The text of the Fifth Amendment itself provides a basis for drawing a distinction
between physical takings and regulatory takings. Its plain language requires the
payment of compensation whenever the government acquires private property for
a public purpose, whether the acquisition is the result of a condemnation
proceeding or a physical appropriation. But the Constitution contains no
comparable reference to regulations that prohibit a property owner from making
certain uses of her private property. Ourjurisprudence involving condemnations
and physical takings is as old as the Republic and, for the most part, involves the
straightforward application of per se rules. Our regulatory takings jurisprudence,
in contrast, is of more recent vintage and is characterized by "essentially ad hoc,
factual inquiries" designed to allow "careful examination and weighing of all the
relevant circumstances.". . .This long-standing distinction between acquisitions
of property for public use, on the one hand, and regulations prohibiting private
uses, on the other, makes it inappropriate to treat cases involving physical takings
as controlling precedents for the evaluation of a claim that there has been a
"regulatory taking," and vice versa. 5
Thus, the Court rejected the clear analogy between physical appropriations
and regulations that deny landowners all economically beneficial or productive
use of their property, even though the Court in Lucas, as well as other takings
cases, repeatedly emphasized the similarities between the two.2
6
The Court next took on the categorical rule itself. The majority first isolated
Lucas by reiterating that "[i]n the decades following [Pennsylvania Coal] we
have 'generally eschewed' any set formula for determining how far is too far,
2 Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1478-79 (citations omitted).
26 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017, 1028-29; San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego,
450 U.S. 621, 652 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Police power regulations... can destroy
the use and enjoyment of property in order to promote the public good just as effectively as
formal condemnation or physical invasion of property."); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S.
40,48 (1960) ("The total destruction by the Government of all value of these liens.., has every
possible element of a Fifth Amendment 'taking."'); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 414 (1922) ("[Rendering a legal use] commercially impracticable ... has very nearly the
same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it."); see also Calvert G.
Chipchase, Comment, Lucas Takings: Why Investment-Backed Expectations are Irrelevant
when Applying the Categorical Rule, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 147, 166-69 (2001) (discussing the
justifications and precedent for the categorical rule).
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choosing instead to engage in 'essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.' 27 It then
began to chip away at the "all economically beneficial use" standard-the
cornerstone of the categorical rule. The majority did so by attempting to
substitute the term "value" for the term "use." For example, Justice Stevens
stated that the lots at issue in Lucas were rendered "valueless" by the
regulation, and that the compensation award represented "the value of the fee
simple estate. 28 That is plainly not true. Even with the restrictions, Lucas's
lots were extremely valuable, just not very useful. Nevertheless, the majority
continued and even expressly refrained the appropriate rule as providing that
"the permanent 'obliteration of the value' of a fee simple estate constitutes a
categorical taking."29 The majority tied its revision of the per se rule to
footnote eight of the Lucas opinion, in which the Lucas Court acknowledged
that the categorical rule did not apply to situations where there was anything
less than a "total loss."3° The Tahoe-Sierra Court, however, failed to disclose
that footnote eight was penned as a response to one of the many blistering
attacks leveled by Justice Stevens, then in the minority, not a fundamental
tenet of the opinion. Nor did it reveal that the distinction drawn in that
footnote between a diminution in value of 95% and one of 100% was a
quotation taken from Justice Stevens' dissent, not something at all attributable
to the Lucas majority.3 The Lucas Court, both in analysis and in effect,
focused on what use David Lucas could make of his property, not how much
the land was worth. Neither judicial sleight of hand, nor the efforts of some
commentators, can make it otherwise.
This blatant mischaracterization is unsurprising given that Justice Stevens
so vigorously dissented from the application of a per se rule at all. In Lucas,
he lamented the Court's "illogical expansion of the concept of 'regulatory
takings"' in general,32 and his objection to the categorical rule in particular was
even more pronounced. According to Justice Stevens, the categorical rule
recognized in Lucas was "unsupported by prior decisions, arbitrary and
unsound in practice, and theoretically unjustified. 3 3 Instead, Justice Stevens
argued that a takings case necessarily "entails inquiry into [several factors,]"
the most important of which being the character of the governmental action.34
That is so, Justice Stevens reasoned, because a regulation "that targets one or
two parcels of land and a regulation that enforces a statewide policy" are
27 Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1481.
28 Id. at 1482.
29 Id. at 1483.
30 Id.
3' Compare Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019, n.8, with id. at 1064 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32 Id. at 1061 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1067.
14 Id. at 1071 (brackets in original).
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simply different and must be analyzed distinctly. 35 Furthermore, Justice
Stevens added, the purposes of the restriction must inform the examination of
its economic impact and the claimant's investment-backed expectations.-"
Because of his preference for a flexible examination of several factors,
weighed according to the individual predilections of those on the Court,
Justice Stevens is fundamentally at odds with an objective rule that asks only
whether the regulation has wholly deprived the owner of the right to make
"economically beneficial use" of her land.37 Accordingly, he made full use of
his first opportunity to convert the test from one of use to one of value.
Changing of the Lucas rule from the "elimination of economically beneficial
use" to the "complete obliteration of all value" would render the per se rule a
nullity. Land always has value, regardless of the degree of
restriction-particularly in places like the Lake Tahoe region or coastal South
Carolina. One cannot help but conclude that the Tahoe-Sierra majority, or at
least Justice Stevens, is after just such a result. Lucas, however, with its clear
language and analogy to physical takings, remains a formidable barrier to that
goal. In 2001, Palazzolo affirmed Lucas in both scope and application.
Tahoe-Sierra neither overruled, nor expressly limited, either opinion. Thus,
both continue as the law of the land. Notwithstanding those realities, Justice
Stevens may have given courts sharing his aversion to the objective limitations
inherent in the Lucas rule enough ammunition to engage in their own subtle
revisionism. Indeed, relying on Tahoe-Sierra, the Kansas State Supreme
Court recently held that "[i]f the entire value of the property is not destroyed,
then the analysis under Penn Central is appropriate., 38 In Kansas, it seems,
the categorical rule is now little more than a truism.
As for merely limiting per se rules, the Lucas dissent has found an
increasingly kindred spirit in Justice O'Connor. To be sure, Justice O'Connor
was a part of the Lucas majority, and she has not attempted to rewrite the
categorical rule. But she has made clear that her "polestar remains the
principles set forth in Penn Central," where the several factors remain entirely
relevant inquiries.39 For example, Justice O'Connor joined fully in the
Palazzolo majority opinion, wherein the Court held that a preacquisition
35 Id. at 1073.
36 Id. at 1075.
3 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
38 See McPherson Landfill, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Shawnee County, 49 P.3d
522, 539 (2002) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Vellequette v. Town of
Woodside, A091682, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. Lexis 6690, at *33 (Cal. Ct. App. July 23, 2002)
("A total loss of all economic value is required to establish a categorical taking."). But see
Mays v. Bd. of Trs. of Miami Township, C.A. Case No. 18997, 2002 Ohio 3303, at *8 (Ohio
Ct. App. June 28, 2002) (holding, even after Tahoe-Sierra, that a taking "may be accomplished
through a regulation that prohibits" all economically feasible use of land).
" Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 533 U.S. 606. 633 (2001).
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regulation, other than a background principle of a state's law of property, is
irrelevant in a Lucas claim and not dispositive in a Penn Central claim."
Justice O'Connor, however, wrote separately to explain her understanding of
what that holding meant to regulatory takings jurisprudence. With respect to
Penn Central claims, Justice O'Connor argued that the Rhode Island Supreme
Court erred only in holding that "the preacquisition enactment of the use
restriction ipsofacto defeats any takings claim based on that use restriction.'
The proper analysis, Justice O'Connor concluded, is to view a prdacquisition
regulation as something that shapes and defines the claimant's investment-
backed expectations, which are in turn but one of three factors to be weighed
when determining whether a partial taking has occurred.42 Indeed, she
vigorously objected to Justice Scalia' s argument that a claimant's "investment-
backed expectations" should not "include the assumed validity of a restriction
that in fact deprives property of so much of its value as to be
unconstitutional. '43 Thus, although Justice O'Connor has not abandoned the
categorical rule, her preference clearly rests with ad hoc evaluations.
In sum, the Tahoe-Sierra majority inveighed against the expansion of
categorical rules for regulatory takings and did its best to undercut the
application of Lucas by substituting "value" for "economically beneficial use."
This approach leaves an enormous amount of discretion to judges and removes
what certainty comes with clear bright-line rules. The approach also tilts the
field steeply in favor of government regulation. Reviewing the opinions of
Justice Stevens, it becomes apparent that this is no accident. His opinions
reflect profound discomfort with the application of Fifth Amendment takings
jurisprudence to property regulations, preferring instead declaratory relief
under the Fourteenth Amendment." For example, in Williamson County
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,45 Justice
Stevens argued, "[T]here is nothing in the Constitution that prevents the
government from electing to abandon the permanent-harm-causing regulation"
without paying compensation.46 Indeed, Justice Stevens, dissenting from the
holding in Dolan, revealed his disdain for regulatory takings in general when
40 For a detailed summary of the facts and holding of Palazzolo, see David L. Callies &
Calvert G. Chipchase, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island: Ripeness and 'Notice' Rule Clarified and
Statutory 'Background Principles' Narrowed, 33 URB. LAW. 907 (2001).
4" Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
42 Id. at 633-34.
41 Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).
44 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 406-08 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 351-53 (1986); Williamson
County Reg'l Plann'g Comm'n v. Hamilton Bankof Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172,202-06 (1985)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
45 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
46 Id. at 203-03 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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he argued that a claimant had "no right to be compensated for a taking unless
the city acquire[d] the property interests that she has refused to surrender. 47
Thus, Justice Stevens would shield the government from its obligation to pay
compensation, no matter how extreme the regulation or how long it had been
in effect. He may have lost that battle, but Justice Stevens' clear preference
for a flexible, ad hoc balancing test is wholly consistent with his bias against
regulatory takings, and helps to explain the fact that he has so rarely found any
land use restriction that "went too far." This confidence in government at the
expense of private landowners is misplaced, as any survey of cases,
administrative actions, and written regulations from places as diverse as
California, New England, and Hawaii clearly demonstrates.
I. THE PROCESS OF PLANNING
The Court has for many years recognized and supported the importance of
land development planning at the state and local government level.4" Indeed,
the Chief Justice has been one of the strongest advocates for planning and
local land use controls,49 coming as he did from a local government
background not shared by other members of the Court. Thus, it is not
particularly surprising to see the Court use the importance of planning as a
basis for supporting moratoria in general. In addition, two facts, specific to the
moratoria at issue in Tahoe-Sierra, made it particularly likely that the Court
would rely on generalities about the importance of planning to deny the
landowners compensation.
First, the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency ("TRPA") justified its moratoria
as necessary to facilitate the development of a regional water quality plan and
a regional environmental threshold carrying capacity plan, all in accordance
4' Dolan, 512 U.S. at 408.
48 See generally Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384-85 (recognizing "the authority of state and local
governments to engage in land use planning"); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321-22 (1987) (discussing the need for
proper planning); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
(upholding the constitutionality of the city's Landmarks Preservation Law against a facial and
as-applied takings challenge); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
(upholding the constitutionality of zoning against a substantive due process challenge); Penn.
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("Government hardly could go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change
in the general law.").
"9 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384-85; FirstEnglish, 482 U.S. at 321-22; Penn Central, 438 U.S.
at 148 n. 11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("It is true that the police power embraces regulations
designed to promote public convenience or the general welfare, and not merely those in the
interest of public health, safety and morals.") (quoting Nashville Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry.
v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 429-30 (1935)).
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with an extensive amendment, in order to preserve the clarity of beautiful Lake
Tahoe.50 The history of the amendment, the extra time it took to formulate the
plan, that California successfully sued to enjoin its implementation, and the
revised plan, all of which took approximately eight years, are well documented
in the Court's summary of facts.
Second, much planning law literature supports interim development controls
as an essential tool in the planning process. A frequently asserted justification,
relied upon by the Tahoe-Sierra Court, is the need to avoid a race to obtain
land development approvals and rezonings in advance of planning processes
that might inhibit such private land development projects.5' Indeed, the Court
noted that "moratoria... are used widely among land-use planners to preserve
the status quo while formulating a more permanent development strategy.,
52
The Court then goes on to list several cases in which federal and state courts
sustained moratoria ranging from ten to eighteen months without
compensation.53
The Court, however, was wrong on several points. To begin with, many of
the cases upholding moratoria-including several that the Court cited in
footnotes-dealt with development restrictions applied only to a single zoning
district or a single stretch of land. The TRPA moratoria were (and are) far
more extensive, in both scope and sweep. Indeed, none of the moratoria cases
cited by the Tahoe-Sierra majority lasted even half as long as the TRPA
moratoria-most less than a third as long.
Furthermore, the literature cited by the Court refers to interim development
controls generally, but the Court wrongly equated that with moratoria
specifically. 4 Not all interim development controls are equal. A moratorium
is an extreme form of such controls, because it absolutely stops all
development. On the other hand, interim zoning and similar measures are
more selective in implementing temporary controls while formulating and
passing long-term plans. Thus, moratoria should logically be used less often,
more selectively, and for shorter periods. Also troubling is that the Tahoe-
Sierra Court blithely assumed that successful development automatically
follows such land use control measures. 5 They may aid the process of
planning, but the connection with successful development is weak.
50 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Plann'g Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465,
1470-73 (2002).
"' See id. 1487 n.33.
52 Id. at 1487.
5 Id. at 1487 n.32.
5 See id. at 1487 ("In fact, the consensus in the planning community appears to be that
moratoria, or 'interim development controls' as they are often called, are an essential tool of
successful development.").
5 See id.
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In addition, the Court seems unable to distinguish between a normal delay
in the land development process and the radical interim development control
that a moratorium represents. This is a shocking misunderstanding of the land
development process, penned by the Justice who also so misunderstood the
variance process that an unworkable ripeness test was foisted upon the land
development community. 56 The normal delays the First English Court spoke
of concerned the time needed to carefully review applications to assure that the
applications were complete and comported with the applicable land
development standards.57 Only in the most egregious circumstances would the
delay for a particular permit take anywhere near the thirty-two months (and
counting) set out in this case.
Lastly, the Court's uninformed ramblings about reciprocity of advantage as
a basis for general moratoria,58 rather than selective permit delays, are
misplaced. The theory of reciprocity of advantage was never meant to apply
to land use regulations, but rather the practice of leaving coal in place in mines
to avoid cave-ins for all concerned.59 The Tahoe-Sierra Court had it all
backwards. It is those landowners who have relatively immediate plans to
develop that need the protection, not the landowning community generally.
As for the extra pressure on planners, the "deliberate pace" of local
government decision-making should be faster, as commentators have observed
for decades.6°
IV. RELEVANT PARCEL IN AN ABSTRACT CONTEXT
We are now left with the question of what parcel or interest is relevant to the
iakings inquiry. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
refused to accept on a facial challenge that a moratorium, even one that lasts
thirty-two months, effects a categorical taking. The constant refrain from both
Courts was that in regulatory taking claims, the focus must be on "the parcel
56 See generally MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986);
Williamson County Reg'l Plann'g Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172
(1985).
5' See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304,
321 (1987) ("We limit our holding to the facts presented, and of course do not deal with the
quite different questions that would arise in the case of normal delays in obtaining building
permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like which are not before us.").
58 See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1489.
9 See Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
60 See, e.g., F. Bosselman, et. a., THE PERMIT EXPLOSION: COORDINATION OF THE
PROLIFERATION (1976).
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as a whole."'" Indeed, the Supreme Court began its analysis of the appropriate
interest by quoting a familiar statement:
"Taking"jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and
attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely
abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a
taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the
nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole ......
After stating the general rule, the majority cited the usual cast of cases that
amalgamate, rather than separate, property interests for the purpose of takings
analysis-Andrus v. Allard,63 Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v.
DeBenedictis,64 and, of course, Penn Central.
To be sure, those cases-as flawed as they are-support the proposition that
courts must analyze the physical elements of a particular parcel as a single
unit. But the Court was on shaky ground when it attempted to explain why the
temporal characteristics of real property should be similarly amalgamated, and,
in particular, why First English-which the Court took great pains to make
clear was not in any way qualified by its opinion-did not control the outcome
of the case.
The Tahoe-Sierra Court began by quoting Justice Brennan's famous dissent
in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego.65 In that dissent, Justice
Brennan proposed a constitutional rule that "the government entity must pay
just compensation for the period commencing on the date the regulation first
effected the 'taking,' and ending on the date the government entity chooses to
rescind or otherwise amend the regulation."66 As the majority accurately noted
in Tahoe-Sierra, the Court fully endorsed Justice Brennan's rule in First
English.67
Although this alone would seem enough to dispel the notion that every
moment of the potentially infinite life of a fee simple estate must be considered
6 Compare Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1481 ("Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in
Penn Central did, however, make it clear that even though multiple factors are relevant in the
analysis of regulatory takings claims, in such cases we must focus on the 'parcel as a whole'.
...") (emphasis in original), with Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Plann'g
Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 775 (9th Cir. 2000) ("In deciding whether a particular governmental
action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on
the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole .... ) (citing Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 117-18 (1978) (emphasis in original)).
62 Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1481 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31).
63 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
"4 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
65 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
66 Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1482 (quoting San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450
U.S. 621, 658 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added).
67 See id. at 1482.
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together when evaluating a regulatory taking claim, the majority nevertheless
embraced that very idea. The Court rejected the dissent's argument that First
English settled the temporal segmentation debate in favor of the landowners68
on the ground that the language in both San Diego Gas and First English as
to the need for compensation, even when the taking is temporary, was
preceded by the requirement that there be a taking in the first place. 69 That is
true to a certain extent. But the legal principle the majority takes from that
factual reality is rebutted repeatedly by the very cases it relied upon. For
example, Justice Brennan in San Diego Gas noted that "[t]he fact that a
regulatory 'taking' may be temporary, by virtue of the government's power to
rescind or amend the regulation, does not make it any less of a constitutional
'taking."' 70  Similarly, the Court in First English held that "'temporary'
takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use of his property, are not
different in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly
requires compensation."'" It follows that if temporary takings "are not
different in kind from permanent takings," when the government has done
something to effect a taking, such as prohibit all economically beneficial use
on a particular parcel of property, compensation is required. It is difficult to
fathom how much more "total" a taking can be when it deprives a landowner
of all use options on vacant land-save the "salvage" uses rejected by Lucas,
such as walking and camping-by way of a moratorium extending for at least
thirty-two months. The Tahoe-Sierra majority rejected both logic and
precedent in holding otherwise.
Finally, the majority accused the Tahoe landowners of circular reasoning by
asking the Court to "sever a 32-month segment from the remainder of each
landowner's fee simple estate,"72 but failed to see the circularity in its own
analysis. As the majority indicated, a total taking of a fee simple estate may
well call for compensation as if the parcel were condemned, but that does not
mean that government should be relieved from paying something akin to an
option price for requiring a landowner to leave land unused for nearly three
years and beyond. In the interests of "justice and fairness," the Court
essentially conflated the issue of what compensation is due for a temporary
taking with the issue of whether a moratorium effects a taking at all.
Hopefully, that error was unintentional and can be corrected in the future. But
the negative, and entirely plausible, view of the Tahoe-Sierra dissenters is that
68 See id. at 1496-97 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
69 See id.
70 See San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 657 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
318 (1987). For further criticisms of the Tahoe-Sierra majority's reading of First English, see
Breemer, supra note 1.
72 Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1483.
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although the majority only rejected the application of a per se rule to the
enactment of all moratoria-and affirmed the possibility that under Penn
Central a moratorium could result in a taking, it is difficult to see when the
majority would ever hold a moratorium to be a taking, given that the "parcel
as a whole" is likely to be the infinite duration of a fee simple absolute.
Therefore, the "denominator" is now by definition enormous, regardless of the
size of the numerator, that is, the duration of the moratorium.
V. CONCLUSION
It is easy to be irritated by the countless mistakes, misinterpretations, and
mischaracterizations in the Tahoe-Sierra opinion, regardless of whether one
is sympathetic to the interests of government or the rights of landowners. But
it is important to remember the context of the issue before the Court. The
broad dicta notwithstanding, the Court simply rejected the argument that the
mere enactment of a moratorium "imposed during the process of devising a
comprehensive land-use plan" always effects a categorical taking. Tahoe-
Sierra did not empower government to restrict development without
compensation, and landowners are not stripped of their constitutional
protections merely because the latest tool to limit beneficial or productive uses
of land is called a moratorium. In the end, and perhaps despite Justice
Stevens' best efforts, Tahoe-Sierra adds little to and takes almost nothing
away from takings jurisprudence.
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